Back in February in Problems with maintenance I reported briefly on the problems that the Australian Defence Force was having with maintenance. Maintenance on its main transport ships was so neglected that it was now too expensive to fix them, so that they had to be taken out of service.
The report of the Rizzo review into support ship repair and maintenance has now been released. It recommends, among other things, that Navy rebuilds its engineering capability from the ground up. Now Australian Defence Minister Smith has announced a review into the availability of the Collins class submarines, another major problem area.
One of the big problems with the constant obsession with productivity improvement through cost cutting, one that I referred to in my February post, lies in the trade-off between the short and long term. It's usually possible to get apparent immediate gains by, for example, deferring maintenance or by outsourcing particular activities. However, this can then lead to later problems of the type that Defence has been experiencing.
Over recent years I have noticed what I have come to call the demise of experience, the loss of in-house knowledge and skills that can, as in the Defence case, mean that the organisation actually lacks the capability to carry out key elements of its core mission.
The problem is quite pervasive. Let me give a small and apparently trivial example.
A few years ago, I was asked to develop a training course for an organisation. Because of the nature of the training (objectives, content, timing, audience) the course was not suitable for on-line delivery. It required face to face delivery through a workshop format.
The organisation had a variety of rules about public documents. The first thing I therefore did was to look for other course examples within the organisation that might provide a template. There were none.
Needing to design from scratch, I went in search of help on some issues with Microsoft Word. There were some things I wanted to do that I had forgotten because of the length of time since I had last done them. I found that there were no Word manuals, nor were there any people within the organisation who had the skills required to help me. In the end, I solved the problem by borrowing and then modifying a template used in another organisation. The whole process added about three days to course preparation time.
I said that this was a small and apparently trivial example, yet it is one that I have seen replicated time after time.
In thinking through this problem, the loss of experience, I ended by breaking it into two parts.
The first is the loss of what we might call background experience, the knowledge of how to do things in a general sense. As organisations have slimmed down, as people have become more narrowly focused, organisations have lost the broader knowledge base that once could be drawn on for problem solving. At the simplest level, this leads to costs and inefficiencies in handling new challenges. More broadly, it increases the organisation's general vulnerability; more mistakes occur.
The second is the loss of mission specific experience of the Defence engineering type. In slimming down, in out sourcing, organisations reduce the number of people with the direct knowledge and skills required to carry out tasks.
The two problems interlink. When I was working in the aerospace and defence environment, the key delivery people were the commercial and project managers who combined broad based knowledge and skills with engineering and technical know how. They knew what to do because they had done it many times before. As new problems arose, they would automatically draw from experience to develop at least first pass solutions for further test.
Many of these people have gone. Initially their loss was not seen. But once things get to the point that they seem to have done in the Australian Navy, suddenly disaster occurs. When you have to scrap ships because of poor maintenance, when you cannot deliver on key tasks, then you are in trouble.
The Rizzo report recommends that Navy rebuild its engineering capability, adding some twenty positions. But where are these people to come from? How many years will it take for them to acquire the experience that Navy once had? And what happens if another emergency occurs in the meantime?
The focus on current problems in the Australian Defence Materiel Organisation ignores, it seems to me, the fact that the genesis of the problems lies in changing management approaches that began to come into effect two decades ago.
I find that as a manager and consultant I have become less tolerant of what I see as short term ism. This is not a good thing because in a professional sense I have to deal with what is now. Yet so often I can see problems coming, I can see steps that might fix or at least improve things, but it requires management to change what they do now. And that can be hard to get across!
